Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Jan, 1976, Volume 44, Issue 1

Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting

https://doi.org/0012-9682(197601)44:1<91:TCASV>2.0.CO;2-X
p. 91-103

Prasanta K. Pattanaik

This paper seeks to prove that under a large class of group decision rules some sincere voting situations will be unstable because of strategic manipulation by single individuals. The concept of stability used is weaker than the stability concepts figuring in many earlier contributions in this area, insofar as under the concept used here any individual, while disrupting a given voting situation, considers the possibility of retaliation by other individuals.


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