The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Econometrica: Jan, 1999, Volume 67, Issue 1
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00006
p. 121-145
Shigehiro Serizawa
We study economies with one private good and one pure public good, and consider the following axioms of social choice functions. says that no agent can benefit by misrepresenting his preferences, regardless of whether the other agents misrepresent or not, and whatever his preferences are. says that if two agents have the same preference, they must be treated equally. says that when the preferences of two agents are switched, their consumption bundles are also switched. says that a social choice function never assigns an allocation which makes some agent worse off than he would be by consuming no public good and paying nothing. In Theorem 1, we characterize the class of strategy‐proof, budget‐balancing, and symmetric social choice functions, assuming convexity of the cost function of the public good. In Theorem 2, we characterize the class of strategy‐proof, budget‐balancing, and anonymous social choice functions. In Theorem 3, we characterize the class of strategy‐proof, budget‐balancing, symmetric, and individually rational social choice functions.
This supplementary appendix contains proofs of some results contained in the paper.
A zip file that contains all the programs used to generate the tables and figures in the paper, as well as a ``read me'' file.
This document contains omitted proofs, formal statements and proofs of results characterizing Complementary Independence for other decision models. It also contains Probabilistic Sophistication for VEU preferences and the analysis of the consumption-savings example of Sec. 4.5
Proofs for the manuscript.
PDF file that contains three appendices that include results of experiments and proofs.
A zip file containing a readme.txt providing details of how the results can be replicated using the other files provided.
PDF file of two technical appendices. Appendix 1 demonstrates how the optimal allocation in the bond-enforcement model can be decentralized into a competitive equilibrium with either national default risk or resident default risk. Appendix 2 describes two alternative strategies to compute the bond-enforcement model.
Replication files for the manuscript.
This supplement contains additional results that combine with Lemmas 1-22 in Appendix A to prove Theorem 2, giving monotonicity properties of the period utility under Axiom GM.
A zip file containing replication files for manuscript and how to attain confidential material
An appendix showing that the example in section 4 outperforms the belief-free equilibria.
A zip file containing replication files for the manuscript.
Appendix 1 describes the algorithm used to construct the regular price series. Appendix 2 describes the computational algorithm used to characterize decision rules and the equilibrium in the model economy. Appendix 3 studies an extension of the model in which the retailer face a fixed cost of changing the temporary price, in addition to the cost of deviating from the regular price.
The supplementary material contains the proofs of the propositions and lemmas stated in Section 2.
This supplement provides a detailed analysis of the exclusive competition game for the two-type specification of the model considered in Section 3 of the paper.
This supplementary appendix contains proofs of some of the results stated in the paper.
A zip file containing the replication files for the manuscript.
This online appendix gives a more detailed study of conditions under which the basic method of proof used for the sufficiency results in the main paper can be applied, with an eye to understanding how much the method might potentially be further generalized, and whether the results still hold when the method does not apply.
This appendix consists of a shorter section describing the added details regarding the empirical work in the paper along with a longer section that presents asymptotic results for the Realized Laplace Transform for the case in which volatility has a deterministic intraday component.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This PDF file contains the proofs of Lemmas found within the manuscript.
A zip file containing the replication files for the manuscript.
This document contains a set of appendices with supplemental material. Appendix E extends the model to introduce worker mobility, consumption amenities, and urban crowding costs. Appendix F derives asymptotic properties of the estimator. Appendix G explains how we compute the minimisation criterium to estimate the values of the parameters. Appendix H provides further details on the data. Appendix I explains how we implement alternative approaches to estimate TFP. Finally, Appendix J provides sector-level estimates using urban areas as spatial units.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This supplement provides proofs for the manuscript.
This pdf contains proofs for the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This supplement contains replication files for the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This document contains additional results and an omitted proof for the manuscript.
Appendix containing proofs omitted from the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
Online supplemental appendix for the manuscript containing additional results.
March 5, 2024
The terms of the Editors of the Econometric Society's three journals end June 30, 2025. We are pleased to announce the incoming Editors and to thank the outgoing Editors for their excellent and continuing service.
Econometrica: Since 2019, Guido Imbens has served as the 14th Editor of Econometrica. On July 1, 2025, Marina Halac will become the Editor.
Quantitative Economics: Stéphane Bonhomme has been the Editor of Quantitative Economics since 2021. His successor will be Bernard Salanié.
Theoretical Economics: The Editor of Theoretical Economics since 2021 has been Simon Board. Taking over for him in July 2025 will be Federico Echenique.
Guido, Stéphane, and Simon have been outstanding Editors. We are grateful to them for the work they have done and will continue to do, and we look forward to further congratulating them next year. We believe Marina, Bernard, and Federico will be outstanding successors and we thank them in advance for their service.
Finally, we are grateful to Larry Samuelson for chairing all three search committees, and we thank the search committee members for their hard and fruitful work:
Econometrica: Christian Dustmann, Lars Hansen, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Ariel Pakes, Helene Rey, and Elie Tamer.
QE: Kate Ho, Michael Keane, Felix Kubler, Whitney Newey, and Frank Schorfheide.
TE: Jeff Ely, Johannes Horner, Gilat Levy, Meg Meyer, and Ran Spiegler.
