Econometrica: May 2011, Volume 79, Issue 3

Weakly Belief‐Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring
p. 877-892

Michihiro Kandori

Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have a wide range of applications, but a complete characterization of all equilibria in this class of games has yet to be obtained. The existing literature has identified a relatively tractable subset of equilibria. The present paper introduces the notion of weakly belief‐free equilibria for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This is a tractable class which subsumes, as a special case, a major part of the existing literature (the belief‐free equilibria). It is shown that this class can outperform the equilibria identified by the previous work.

Log In To View Full Content

Supplemental Material

Supplement to "Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring"

An appendix showing that the example in section 4 outperforms the belief-free equilibria.

Read More View PDF